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We provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference 
dependence are important in shaping people’s perception of trade policy.  
Under the assumption that agents’ welfare functions exhibit these 
behavioral elements, we analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing 
government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman 
(1994).  The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three 
important ways.  One, there is a region of compensating protection, where 
a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, 
such that a constant domestic price is maintained.  Two, protection 
following a single negative price shock will be persistent.  Three, 
irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free 
trade that tends to favor loss-making industries.  The augmented models 
are more consistent with the observed structure of protection, and in 
particular, explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly 
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I. Introduction  
Free trade is among the most commonly expounded themes in economics, yet 
governments rarely implement liberal trade policies.  As a result, a large literature on the 
political economy of trade policy has emerged over the years to explain the impediments 
to free trade.  Most models include a characterization of individuals' preferences over the 
trade policy domain and define a mechanism for aggregating preferences into demand 
functions for actual policy.
1 Preferences are based on how trade policies affect 
individuals’ income levels, either through factor endowments or sector-specific skills, 
depending if the underlying economic environment is based on a Hecksher-Ohlin or 
Ricardo-Viner framework.   
In this paper, we provide survey evidence showing that people’s trade policy 
preferences are not only influenced by the level of income, but also by deviations from it.   
Specifically, a majority of people support the implementation of protectionist policies if 
profit losses and salary cuts would otherwise be incurred. However, they do not support 
the implementation of identical policies that would increase profits and salaries by the 
same amount.  Moreover, once a policy that increased profits and salaries is in place, a 
majority of people do not support removing it.  Under standard preferences, all three 
scenarios should yield identical responses.  This divergence implies that behavioral 
elements, such as loss aversion and reference dependence, play an important role in 
shaping preferences toward trade policies.  (Loss aversion implies that an income loss 
reduces welfare more than a gain of equal magnitude increases welfare, and reference 
dependence indicates the presence of a critical level from which the welfare loss is 
measured.)   
Motivated by the survey results, we, then, construct a political-economy model 
where the individuals’ utility functions exhibit loss aversion and reference dependence. 
We show that the introduction of such behavioral features into individual preferences 
leads to important effects on trade policy formation, regardless of whether the 
policymaker is maximizing social welfare or is influenced by political contributions a la 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). Due to loss aversion, preventing losses, as opposed to 
                                                 
1 The policymakers’ preferences and the institutional setting of the political process are the other two 
elements of these models (Rodrik, 1985, p.1458).   3
obtaining gains, looms larger in government’s objective function. Hence, all else equal, 
the government responds to a negative shock with protection. We refer to this as the 
behavioral effect.  In contrast, the optimal policy is free trade if the government is 
maximizing standard social welfare. In a standard political economy model, where the 
government is influenced by other motivations such as lobbying, the equilibrium 
protection level is increasing in output since the gain from a marginal increase in the 
price level is directly proportional to the size of the output of the industry.  Hence, a 
negative shock that reduces sales (for a given price level) reduces the value of protection 
and leads to lower equilibrium tariff level.  We refer to this as the standard effect.  
These two simple forces generate protection dynamics that are similar to those 
observed in many industries. If an industry experiences a negative world price shock that 
reduces income to below its reference point, the behavioral effect leads to an increase in 
protection while the standard effect dampens the demand for it.  Initially, within a given 
range of world prices, the behavioral effect dominates the standard effect generating a 
region of compensating protection: trade policy exactly offsets the world price shock and 
a constant domestic price is maintained. If conditions worsen and the industry further 
contracts due to even lower world prices, the standard effect becomes stronger while the 
behavioral effect becomes less prominent due to diminishing sensitivity to losses.   Thus, 
the level of protection in a declining industry is hump-shaped: first increasing then 
decreasing, and eventually approaching free trade as the industry continues to become 
less competitive. 
The region of compensating protection, where trade policy is used to shelter the 
domestic firms from global price fluctuations, is one of the important predictions of the 
paper.  In our model, this type of protection occurs in sectors with significant presence 
(output, employment, etc) but that are not very competitive in world markets. In practice, 
many forms of protection, including quotas, price floors, and voluntary restraint 
agreements, serve precisely this purpose in sectors such as agriculture, apparel and steel. 
They bind only when world prices fall and there is effectively free trade for prices above 
a certain level. Another common protectionist measure, antidumping charges, can only be 
initiated when the import prices fall and there is “injury” to domestic firms. Thus,  the   4
type and motivation for protection predicted by our model exhibits remarkable overlap 
with existing policies. 
Our modified model provides explanations for some of the puzzles in recent 
empirical papers that aim to examine the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model. For 
example, both Maggi & Goldberg (1999) and Gawande & Bandyopadhyay (2000) infer 
from their estimation results that the government attaches “too little” weight to political 
contributions, as opposed to social welfare, in its decision process, to the extent that 
political considerations do not seem to affect policy. When loss aversion is formally 
introduced into the model, the theoretical relationship between the estimated coefficients 
of the empirical model and weights attached to the social welfare and monetary 
contributions changes. As a result, for the same set of estimation results, the inferred 
value of the weight of social welfare in government’s objective function goes down to a 
more acceptable level.  
Our enhanced model also offers additional insights into several long-standing 
puzzles in the literature. A prominent one is referred to as the  Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle by 
Rodrik (1995): “trade policy is systematically used to transfer resources to import-
competing sectors rather than to export-oriented sectors.”  This is closely related to the 
declining industry protectionism where the level of protection is observed to increase as 
industries start to decline. As mentioned above, standard models tend to predict the 
opposite
2, whereas our predictions are very close to the observed policies. We also offer 
an explanation for another empirical regularity - the persistence of protectionist policies.  
Once in place, protection becomes difficult to remove because it gets incorporated into 
the reference welfare level.  If a shock persists, protection becomes permanent and the 
industry never fully adjusts to the new market structure.  Past levels of protection 
therefore become very important determinants of current protection. 
The next section presents results from our survey and demonstrates the 
importance of loss aversion and reference dependence in peoples’ perceptions of trade 
policy.  Section III discusses how this model fits into the political economy literature on 
                                                 
2 In the GH model lobbying leads to higher subsidies in an export sector, as compared with the tariffs that 
an otherwise-identical import competing sector receives [see Levy (1999) for a discussion].  The same 
feature holds for other political economy models such as the tariff-formation approach of Findlay &   5
protection.  Section IV presents an analytical model where the government maximizes 
social welfare that features behavioral elements. In Section V, we modify this model to 
incorporate into the influential lobbying model of Grossman and Helpman. In Section VI 
we analyze the observed policy patterns and tools in light of our analytical predictions.  
Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Loss Aversion in Trade Policy: An Experiment
3 
Numerous empirical studies from the behavioral literature find that the value 
people assign to a loss is significantly larger than the value assigned to an equivalent 
gain.  In particular, for small or moderate gains and losses of money, the estimated value 
assigned to a loss is about twice as large as a similar gain (see Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1991) for a survey of the literature).  Losses are also by definition time 
dependent, and reflect a particular reference point.   For example, a firm accustomed to a 
high profit level will regard a low profit level as unacceptable, while a firm accustomed 
to a low profit level will find maintaining that level to be satisfactory. 
An implication of loss aversion and reference dependence is that the value 
assigned to foregone gains is lower than that assigned to losses.  This is reflected in many 
judicial outcomes, where the weight assigned to unrealized profits is typically well below 
the weight assigned to incurred losses.  Survey evidence also bears this out.  For example, 
faced with excess demand for a particular car model, a company that discontinues a 
discount of $200 is considered fair; but, a company that raises the price by $200 is 
considered unfair by a majority of respondents (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991).  
This implies that imposing a surcharge (perceived as a loss) is considered less acceptable 
than eliminating a discount (perceived as a gain).   
Loss aversion and reference dependence also have implications for people’s 
perceptions of trade policy.  Tharakan (1996, p. 1562) notes that “[p]erhaps the weakest 
point in the political economy analysis of protection  has been the rather superficial way 
in which it has so far taken into account the public perception of trade relations.”  Indeed, 
very few studies examine people’s sentiments on trade policy.  Two exceptions are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wellisz (1982), political support function of Hillman (1989) and campaign contributions approach of 
Magee, Brock and Young (1989).    6
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2003), which use survey evidence 
to evaluate determinants of individual preferences.  They find that factor endowments 
guide trade preferences.  But their focus is on the relationship between individual 
characteristics and protectionism and not on the conditions for trade barriers to be 
considered acceptable by a majority.  Loss aversion may play a very important role in 
people’s perceptions, as the argument for free trade relies on the same weight being given 
to gains and losses.  
In order to test to what extent loss aversion carries over to peoples perception of 
trade policy, we conducted a simple survey.  The following three questions were asked 
with each person answering only one of the questions:
4 
 
1.  A manufacturing industry faces competition from imports.  Its losses are expected 
to be $20 million this year and firms are expected to reduce salaries by 10%.  If a 
tariff is placed on imports of competing goods then losses will be avoided and 
salaries will be maintained.  The tariff will cause the price of the good, which 
everyone consumes, to rise from $30 to $40. Do you support the tariff?    
 
N= 102   Yes: 60 percent      No: 40 percent 
 
2.  A manufacturing industry faces competition from imports.   If a tariff is placed on 
imports of competing goods then profits will increase by $20 million and firms in 
the industry will increase salaries by 10%.  The tariff will cause the price of the 
good, which everyone consumes, to rise from $30 to $40. Do you support the 
tariff?    
 
N= 100   Yes: 37 percent     No: 63 percent 
 
3.  A manufacturing industry faces competition from imports, which are subject to a 
tariff.  Removal of the tariff will cause profits to decline by $20 million and 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 We would like to thank Sendhil Mullainathan for suggesting us to conduct a survey to motivate the paper.  
4 The survey was given to 303 people visiting the Washington Mall in June 2004.   7
salaries to fall by 10%.  As a result of the tariff removal, the price of the good, 
which everyone consumes, will fall from $40 to $30.  Do you support maintaining 
the tariff?   
 
N= 101   Yes: 61 percent     No: 39 percent 
 
The first question proposes implementing a tariff to prevent losses and the second 
proposes using a tariff to promote gains of equal magnitude.  The cost of the tariff to 
consumers is identical in both settings.  The majority of people find it acceptable to use a 
tariff to prevent profit losses and wage cuts, but do not find it acceptable to use a tariff to 
promote profits and raises.
5  Using a two-tailed t-test and allowing for different variance 
across samples, the means of the two samples are different at the 1 percent level. 
The third question highlights the importance of reference dependence and how 
loss aversion is different from risk aversion.  Though the majority of people do not favor 
imposing a tariff in question 2, they would favor maintaining it if it were in place. This 
implies that tariffs, once implemented, are likely to be persistent.  Note that if 
respondents were simply expressing risk aversion there should be no difference between 
the responses to questions 2 and 3 since the only difference is the reference point.  Again, 
the means of the two samples are significantly different at the 1 percent level. 
In sum, the results of this experiment imply that protection as a means of 
preventing losses is considered to be desirable by a majority of people, but similar 
protection to facilitate gains is perceived as undesirable.  It also shows that once in place, 
a tariff that may not have been supported initially is difficult to eliminate.  These effects 
are consistent with the structure of protection in most countries and also with Rodrik’s 
(1995) Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle. 
 
III. The Political Economy of Trade Policy  
  Our analytical model builds on political economy models of lobbying for trade 
policy and declining industry protectionism.  The first generation of political economy 
                                                 
5 We also asked the question to a smaller sample with job cuts and job increases to a smaller sample and the 
result was maintained.   8
models relied on a reduced form government welfare function that places more weight on 
certain sectors of the economy to generate protectionist  policies for them.  Among these, 
the most prominent examples are the tariff-formation function approach of Findlay and 
Wellisz (1982), the political support function approach of Hillman (1989), the median-
voter approach of Mayer (1984), and the campaign contributions approach of Magee, 
Brock and Young (1989).  We do not go into details, as these are reviewed in Baldwin 
(1989) and Rodrik (1995) and other places.  Similar government objective functions were 
also used in earlier studies on senescent industry protection.  In one of the earliest studies, 
Corden (1974) uses a conservative welfare function, whereby the government seeks to 
avoid “any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section of 
the community” (p.107).  Cordon’s welfare function displays loss aversion—reductions 
in income have greater weight than increases—in order to generate (observed) protection 
for declining sectors.  However, the conservative welfare function was not derived from 
consumer utility, but chosen because it most closely reflected protectionist policies.  But 
perhaps more importantly, because of its ad hoc nature, it does not offer specific 
predictions about trade policy. Hillman (1982) and Long and Vousden (1991) use a 
political support function to explain why declining industries get more protection.  In 
their models, the policymaker wants to spread the cost of a price decline in a import-
competing sector over the whole population.  The intuition in these models comes from 
risk sharing as opposed to preventing losses.   
A shortcoming of this class of models is their use of a reduced-form government 
welfare function that essentially places more weight on certain sectors in order to 
generate protection for those sectors—the trade policy outcome is effectively assumed at 
the onset.  In an influential contribution, Grossman and Helpman (1994, henceforth GH) 
develop a model that derives the government’s objective function endogenously from 
micro-foundations. The preferences of lobby groups and the policymaker are explicitly 
specified and there is a specific lobbying game played between them. The weights that 
the government places on interests of different groups are derived endogenously. 
Although the structure of the model is more rigorous, some of its predictions are at odds 
with observed policy outcomes.  First, the GH model predicts that if all industries are 
represented through lobbies, the equilibrium policy outcome will be free trade in all   9
sectors.  As a result, one needs to assume that only some of the sectors are organized to 
generate protection.  This implies that, as with the previous models, the extra weight 
given to lobbying sectors is to some extent determined exogenously.
6  Second, the model 
predicts that export sectors should receive more protection, which runs counter to the 
empirical evidence.  Third, according to the lobbying models, if a sector suffers a 
negative price shock, protection should fall.  In reality, it is the sectors that face negative 
shocks that receive more protection.  Finally, the model does not offer any insights about 
the persistence of protection. 
Our work is also closely related to another strand of the literature that explains 
protection using risk aversion and incomplete insurance markets.  Eaton & Grossman 
(1985) and Fischer & Prusa (2003) explain observed protection patterns as a form of 
insurance.  If agents are risk averse and capital is allocated before the state of the world is 
known, then there will be scope for a small tariff to offset losses in a bad state.  In these 
models, the tariff reallocates income to the losing sector, where the marginal value of 
income is lower.  While some of the behavioral elements that we include are similar to 
risk aversion, there are also some important differences.  First, as noted in the previous 
section, risk aversion does not incorporate reference dependence.  This implies that some 
important predictions from our model—such as compensating protection—would not be 
part of a model with risk aversion alone.  Second, because of the concavity assumption, 
very high levels of risk aversion would be needed to generate sizeable tariffs in a 
standard model.  Third, risk aversion also fails to explain the differences in the responses 
to the questions in our survey. As noted, under risk aversion, the responses to questions 2 
and 3 should have been similar. The difference is caused by a sudden change in the slope 
of the welfare function due to the reference point. Finally, risk aversion can not account 
for persistence of  protection once it has been implemented. This has been identified 
many times in the empirical literature.  However, behavioral elements can explain this 
observation. Especially if protection causes the reference point to shift, it becomes very 
difficult to remove it once it is in place.  
 
                                                 
6 To endogenize the lobby formation process, Mitra (1999) assumes that there are varying levels of 
exogenous fixed costs to form a lobby. Only the sectors for which it is cost effective will form a lobby and   10
IV. Analytical Model  
We begin with a standard specific-factors model and incorporate standard 
behavioral assumptions.  The key insight from the behavioral literature is that welfare is 
not only dependent on the current state but on the change in states. In particular, Tversky 
and Kahneman (2000) define three characteristics of value function that differ from 
standard utility theory.  The first is reference dependence: gains and losses relative to a 
reference point are important.  The second is loss aversion: losses have larger effects on 
welfare than corresponding gains.  The third is diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value 
of gains and losses decreases with their size.  The introduction of these behavioral 
assumptions into the objective function of the government resolves many of the 
incongruities between predictions of the political economy models and observed policy 
outcomes.  
We do not address the question of why trade policy, as opposed to other less 
distortionary methods of intervention, is used to redistribute income.  In general, a tax 
cum subsidy will always be more efficient.  In our model, we simply assume trade policy 
is the only tool.  We rely on other explanations having to do with feasibility of assistance 
and other potential distortions that direct assistance might introduce.
7   
In describing the model, we begin with the production side.  There are n+1 
consumption goods where good 0 is the numeraire and is produced with labor alone using 
constant returns to scale technology.  The supply of labor is large enough to guarantee 
supply of good 0 so that its price and the wage rate are both set to 1.  All other goods, 
indexed 1…n,  require labor and a sector specific input with fixed supply; their 
production technology also exhibits constant returns to scale.  The rewards to the owners 
of the sector specific factor used in the production of good i is determined by the 
domestic price the good, pi, and is denoted by πi(pi).  Finally, the supply of the good i is 
denoted by yi(pi)= π’i(pi). 
                                                                                                                                                 
obtain protection. 
7  Loss aversion may provide insight as to why a tariff is preferred to a tax cum subsidy.  A tax will directly 
affect incomes and thus will reduce welfare due to loss aversion. A tariff only affects relative prices, and 
while this introduces a distortion, the resulting loss may be smaller than the loss due to loss aversion.  This 
is consistent with the findings of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) that the vast majority of people 
find nominal salary reductions less acceptable than price increases.  In principle, revenue for the subsidy 
could be obtained via inflation, however, there are other well-known costs to inflation that might make this 
more costly for redistribution than a tariff (as well as infeasible due to the independency of central banks).   11
The economy is composed of  individuals who derive utility from the 
consumption of these n+1 consumption goods.  In addition, each person owns a share of 
the sector specific factors.  For simplicity, we assume that each individual owns only one 
type of specific factor and the ownership levels are identical across individual owners of 
the same factor.  It is worth noting that this is not necessarily a model about capital 
owners, as the return to specific factors can also be thought of as a wage premium for 
sector-specific skills.  The indirect utility function of an individual who owns specific 
factor j is 
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where p is the domestic price vector, E is income from labor and specific factor 
ownership, s(p) is the consumer surplus, αj is the fraction of the population that owns 
specific factor j, and N is population size.
8   
Loss aversion is introduced through the function h(.).  The function is increasing 
in the difference between reference profits and actual profits, reflecting the extent of the 
loss an individual feels for receiving less than they are accustomed to (h’(.)>0).  However 
the marginal increase is declining in the size of the loss  (h’’(.)<0), which represents 
diminishing sensitivity to losses.  A large body of empirical evidence from the behavioral 
literature finds that people are risk loving in the domain of losses.
9  IL is an indicator 
variable which takes the value of 1 if expected income from the specific factor falls 
below the reference point, i.e.  0 ) ( ) (
_
> − j j p p π π .  Since the reward level, π(pj), is 
strictly increasing in pj, the reference reward level corresponds to a unique reference 
price, denoted as  j p
_
.  The shape of function h(.)  together with the indicator variable IL  
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.  In behavioral theory it is common to augment a 
utility function with the loss aversion term.  Thus, we are excluding loss aversion with respect to price 
increases of the n goods, which would complicate the analysis dramatically.  Moreover, evidence implies 
that people are more averse to income loss than changes in prices (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). 
9 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for the original version of prospect theory and Rabin (1998) and 
Barberis and Thaler (2002) for a summary of the evidence.   12
imply that owners of specific factor j perceive a decline in their welfare when income 
falls below the reference point but do not derive any additional utility for reward levels 
above it.   
Net individual tariff revenue can be written as the sum of the trade tax on each 
product multiplied by individual net imports demand: 
(2)   )] (
1
) ( )[ ( ) (
*
i i i i
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N
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where pi* is the world price of good i,  di(pi) is the individual demand function, and  yi(pi) 
is the domestic supply function of good i.  The standard social welfare function without 
the loss aversion factor is given by 
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where l is labor income and p is the price vector. Now, let the loss aversion for the whole 
country be represented by the following function: 
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where L represents the sectors with prices below their reference levels.  The modified 
social welfare function with loss aversion is simply the sum of these two functions: 
(5)   ) ( ) ( ) ( p H p W p G + =  
The government sets policy in sector i to maximize social welfare as presented in 
expression (5).  Since the consumers’ utility functions are additive, we can treat each 
sector i individually when finding the optimal policy. There are several different 
scenarios to consider: 
Case 1: The world price is above the reservation price; i.e.  i i p p
_
* ≥ : In this case, 
we have H(p)=0. The optimum domestic price is found by  0 ) ( ' ) ( ' = = i i p W p G  which 
implies the optimum domestic price is the world price:
* 0
i i p p = or the government sets the 
tariff at zero and free trade prevails. 
Case 2: The world price is below the reservation price; i.e.  i i p p
_
* < : This case is 
shown in Figure 1 for industry i, where the domestic price, pi, is on the x-axis. Both W(pi)   13
and H(pi) are drawn as functions of the domestic price, pi, for a given level of foreign 
price, p*i.  W(pi) has a unique maximum at the world price level p*i since free trade 
maximizes the standard social welfare. H(pi) is convex and has negative (zero) values 
below (above) the reference price  i p
_
.  
As can be seen from the figure, the maximum of the modified social welfare 
function ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i p H p W p G + = is going to be in the region  i i i p p p
_
* ≤ < . If  pi is less 
than p*i, then both W(pi) and H(pi) are decreasing, and G(.) cannot attain its maximum; 
for values larger than  i p
_
, H(pi) is zero and W(pi) is again decreasing. At 
*
i i p p = , we 
have W’(pi)=0, H’(pi)>0 and therefore G’(pi)>0 which means G(pi) can not take its 
maximum value at 
*
i p . The alternatives are that either there is an interior solution or a 
corner solution at 
−
= i i p p . In order to analyze these two cases, we first define the first 
order condition:  
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where mi (pi) is net import demand, mi(pi) = Ndi(pi) – yi(pi) 
 
Case 2a: FOC is satisfied in the region  i i i p p p
_
* ≤ < : Suppose the FOC is 
satisfied at point 
o
i p . Since  0 ) ( '
* > i p G , 
o
i p  is either an inflection point or maximum. In 
order to rule out the inflection point case, we need to check the second-order condition is 
also satisfied and show that  0 ) ( ' ' <
o
i p G .
10  This scenario is presented in Figure 2. The 
optimal policy for the government is to choose the tariff level so that the domestic price 
                                                 
10 There is a possibility that the FOC is satisfied multiple times in this region. The presence of multiple 
points does not change any of our results; the government simply has to find the global maximum among 
these. The other alternative is to impose restrictions on these functions to guarantee that FOC is satisfied 
only at a single point. Among the many reasonable restrictions are the following: Suppose both the FOC 
and SOC is satisfied at point p
0; then for all p> p
0 , H’’+W’’<0. Another option is to assume that H(.) is 
quadratic and the domestic supply and demand functions are linear (so that W(.) is also quadratic). Then 
G(.)=H(.)+W(.) is also quadratic and we are guaranteed to have FOC satisfied at most once in any given 
range and to avoid any inflection points.   14
level is set at 
o
i p . The optimal tariff is given by the following expression which is 
derived from the FOC in (8): 
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i p m p y z = is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports and 








i p m p p m e − =  is the elasticity of import demand or of export supply.   
The expression above states that only the industries where prices are below the 
reference point receive protection.  The optimal tariff equates the marginal gain as a 
result of reducing sector-specific losses to the marginal loss in aggregate welfare that the 
tariff induces.  As is standard, the tariff is increasing in the ratio of output to imports 
since the cost to the economy in terms of loss aversion is higher if the sector is large.  In 
addition, it is greater for industries with a more elastic import demand (or export supply) 
since the welfare cost of the tariff is smaller if import demand is inelastic.  There will 
always be a small positive tariff since H’(p*)>0 and W’(p*)=0. 
 
Case 2b: The FOC is not  satisfied (or there is an inflection point) in the region 
i i i p p p
_
* ≤ < : If the FOC is not satisfied, then we have  0 ) ( ' >
o
i p G  for the whole region. 
Alternatively, suppose the FOC is satisfied but the SOC is not, i.e. we are at an inflection 
point and  0 ) ( ' =
o
i p G  &  0 ) ( ' ' =
o
i p G . These imply, in either case, H’(.) is larger than or 
equal to W’(.) in absolute value at every point in the entire range. Therefore G(.) is 
increasing, reaches its maximum at  i p
_
 and we have a corner solution as depicted in 
Figure 3. In this case, loss aversion at  i p
_
is so large that the marginal gain from a 
reduction in loss aversion is always greater than the marginal loss in standard social 
welfare from protection, i.e.  0 ) ( ' ) ( '
_ _
> + i i p W p H . The government chooses trade policy 
so that domestic price is set at  i p
_
. Once the reference price is reached, however, loss 
aversion disappears. Any further increase in tariff simply reduces welfare and therefore 
never gets implemented.    15
Next, we show that the magnitude of difference between the world price and the 
reference price can determine whether you are in Case 2a or 2b. 
 
World Prices and Domestic Protection  
In this section, we evaluate how domestic protection responds to changes in world 
prices.  For sectors where the world price is above the reference price level ,
_
p  the optimal 
policy is free trade and domestic price equals world price. In sectors where the world 
price is below  ,
_
p  the optimal policy is protection and the domestic price is set above the 
world price.  The key question is, for a given level of world price, whether the trade 
policy outcome is in Case 2a, where domestic price is above world price but below the 
reference level, or in Case 2b, where it is set exactly at the reference level.  
In order to answer this question, suppose world price falls from an initial level at 
_
p  to a level ε below it so that  ε − = i i p p
_
* .  We know that  0 ) ( '
_
= −ε i p W  and 
0 ) ( '
_
> −ε p H , which means  0 ) ( ' ) ( '
_ _
> + p W p H if ε is small enough. Thus, for world 
prices slightly below the reference level, we are in Case 2b (corner solution) and the 
optimal policy is to choose the tariff that brings the domestic price to the reference level.   
The intuition is that the loss aversion function H(.) is steepest when it is close to the 
reference point due to diminishing sensitivity to losses.  On the other hand, standard 
welfare function W(.) is flattest when close to its maximum which is at   ε − = i i p p
_
*  in 
this case. Thus, when price is slightly below the reference point, loss aversion dominates 
the welfare loss and it is optimal to institute compensating protection. 
Next, we evaluate what happens to protection as ε increases.  We observe that 
) ( '
_
i p W  is increasing in 
*
i p  (but decreasing in absolute value since it is negative). This is 
due to the fact that the distortion in standard social welfare declines as the magnitude of 
the tariff that equates price to the reference level goes down.  Therefore as ε  increases 
(or as 
*
i p  moves away from  i p
_
),  ) ( '
_
i p W becomes more negative. In other words, the 
slope of the standard welfare function at the reference point,  ) ( '
_
i p W , becomes steeper as   16
the reference point moves away from the world price.  Then, for ε large enough or 
*
i p  
low enough, we have  0 ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( '
_ _ _
< + = p W p H p G  since  ) ( '
_
i p H  is constant.  This 
statement, combined with the fact that  0 ) ( '
* > i p G  implies there is a point 
o
i p  in between 
*
i p and 
_
i p where  0 ) ; ( '
* = i
o
i p p G . In other words, as the world price 
*
i p  continues to 
decline and move away from the reference level 
_
i p , at some point we move from a 
corner solution to an interior solution.  Furthermore, the interior solution 
o
i p will also 
decrease as the world price declines using the same arguments.  The intuition is that when 
the price shock is very large, the marginal loss from a compensating tariff is larger than 
the marginal gain from eliminating losses.  Instead there is some tariff level such that the 
marginal loss in standard social welfare is exactly offset by the marginal change in the 
loss aversion function. 
  The relationship between the world price and optimal domestic price exhibits the 
pattern in Figure 4. Similarly the relationship between tariffs and world prices are 
depicted in Figure 5.  Among the most important predictions of the model is the 
intermediate range of world prices where trade policy is used to shelter the domestic 
sector from world price fluctuations. In this region, denoted as  i i
A
i p p p
_
* < < in both 
figures 4 and 5, the domestic price is set exactly at the reference level and the tariff level 
adjusts to keep the domestic price constant as the world price changes. For world prices 
below 
A
i p , there is protection but not high enough to bring the domestic price to the 
reference level.  The reason is straightforward. As the world price continues to fall, the 
government needs to continuously increase the tariffs to maintain a fixed domestic price 
level. This means the marginal cost of this tariff due distortions to standard social welfare 
is increasing. On the other hand, due to diminishing sensitivity to losses (h”<0), the 
marginal gain from the tariff through decreases in loss aversion is also declining. As a 
result, it no longer becomes optimal to maintain the reference prices and the domestic 
price declines as the world price declines. Furthermore, the actual protection level also 
declines with world prices. As the sector shrinks and the gap between the reference price 
and world price increases, we once again approach free trade.   17
The region of compensating protection predicted by the model is especially 
appealing, as in practice, it is the declines in world prices that generate demands for 
protection, especially to maintain the domestic status quo (see Section VI). Most political 
economy models in the literature generate results that contradict this behavior. For 
example, in Grossman & Helpman (1994), protection is uniformly increasing in world 
prices. In our model, on the other hand, declines in world prices below the reference level 
can trigger protection. Furthermore, protection is implemented in sectors that still have 
significant presence (output and employment) but are starting to lose their relative 
competitiveness.  In the next section, we show that the result is maintained in a model 
with lobbying for protection. 
 
V. Lobbying for Protection 
In this section, we modify the previous framework by explicitly incorporating the 
influential lobbying for protection model of Grossman and Helpman (1994).  We show 
that the results from the standard model are, in general, magnified in a model with 
lobbying and the basic features of the results are maintained. We continue with the 
specific factors model above with good 0 as the numeraire. We allow some sectors to be 
organized and lobby for protection as in the original GH model. 
From equations 1 and 3 above, the joint welfare of the owners of specific factor i 
is defined as  
(8)  0 " , 0 ' ),
) ( ) (
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We refer to this group as lobby i since their interests are aligned and opposed to owners 
of other specific factors.  Recall that  ) (
_
i p π  is the reference profit level based on price 
level
_
i p . If profits fall below reference level (i.e. if IL=1), the members of the lobby 
group experience a loss through the function h(.), in addition to the direct income loss 
through a decline of πi(pi), the second term in the expression above.   
  Since the country is small, it has no influence over the world price vector  p*, and 
the trade-policy vector uniquely determines domestic prices.  The government cares 
about social welfare and values monetary political contributions which can be used for a   18
variety of purposes including campaign spending.  We adopt a linear objective function 
for the government: 
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Where G(p) represent social welfare inclusive of loss aversion and ΣOCi(p) is the sum of 
the contributions from the set of organized lobbies, O.  The social welfare has a relative 
weight of a in the government’s objective function and the only restriction is a>0.  
Aggregate welfare is defined in equation (5) above and incorporates behavioral elements. 
  The lobbying game played between the lobby and the government is identical to 
the GH framework and is based upon Bernheim and Whinston’s (1986) menu auction.  In 
the first stage, the lobbies simultaneously submit contribution schedules contingent on the 
trade-policy vector implemented by the government.  Given these schedules, the 
government maximizes its objective function given by (9) and chooses a domestic price 
vector in the second stage.  The equilibrium outcome is a set of contribution schedules 
and a domestic price vector (or the corresponding trade policy vector).  Bernheim & 
Whinston (1986) show that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game has some 
nice properties.  For example, for each lobby group i, the equilibrium price vector 
maximizes the joint welfare of the that group and the government,  given the contribution 
schedules of all other organized lobby groups.  Furthermore, the contribution schedules 
are locally truthful so that they reveal the true preferences.
11  These imply the equilibrium 
domestic price vector satisfies the following: 
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In order to find the equilibrium price vector, we first calculate the effect of change in pj 
on the welfare of lobby i.  We obtain the following from (5) and (8), 
(11)   () (.) ' ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ) (
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where δij is an indicator variable that is 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, and mj (pj) is net import 
demand, mj(pj) = Ndj(pj) - yj(pj). 
                                                 
11 Bernheim & Winston and GH discuss in length why it is enough to focus on truthful contribution 
schedules since these are coalition-proof. We refer the reader to these papers.     19
  Next, we sum equation (11) over the set of organized lobbies, O, to obtain the 
change in welfare for all lobbies with respect to change in price pj,   
(12)   (.) ' ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) (
* h p y I I p m p p p y I
p
G
j j j L j j j j L j j O j
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α α , 
where Ij is an indicator variable equal to 1 if industry j is organized and αO is the fraction 
of the total population of voters that are represented by an organized lobby. 
Recall that the equilibrium condition is given by (10) and implies: 













, for j = 1, …, n 
where a is the weight on social welfare.  Using equations (6) and (12), first order 
condition is  
(14) 
0 )
) ( ) (




+ + − + + −
N
p p
h p y I a I p m p p a p y I
i
i i
i i i i L i i i i L i i i L α
π π
α α  
Again this FOC might not be satisfied if we are at a corner solution.  In that case, the 
optimal tariff compensates the industry up to the reference price level (we return to this 
situation below).  Ignoring the corner solution for the moment, the optimal trade tax ti, 
defined as 
* * / ) ( i i i i p p p t − = , can be expressed as  
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We can rewrite this condition as  
(16) 
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i p m p y z = is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports and 








i p m p p m e − = is the elasticity of import demand or of export supply.     20
  The expression for the equilibrium trade tax is identical to the result in GH except 
for the behavioral term in square brackets. Many of the insights from the GH framework 
are carried over.  The distortion imposed (subsidy or a tax) declines as the government 
places more weight on social welfare, expressed through the parameter a.  The size of the 
distortion is positively related to the ratio of domestic output to imports, zi.  If the level of  
domestic output of an organized sector is high, for a fixed level of import demand 
elasticity, then the lobby has more to gain from a marginal increase in the domestic price.  
The contribution schedule will reflect this and the equilibrium protection level will be 
higher.  
The behavioral term, on the other hand, again, introduces important implications 
for trade policy.  One consequence of the GH model is that if all sectors are organized 
(i.e. I i=1 for all i) and everybody is represented by a lobby group (αL=1), then there is 
free trade in equilibrium. This outcome is due to the fact that interest groups neutralize 
each other and the interests of the producers are exactly matched by the opposing 
interests of the consumers.  In our setting, trade is distorted even if everybody is 
represented by a lobby group (i.e. Ii=1 for all i and αL=1).  If all sectors are organized, 
the equilibrium tariff reverts to  























This tariff level is identical to expression (7) which means when all sectors are political 
active, the modified social welfare function in (5) is maximized. However, unlike the 
case in other models, the social optimum involves positive tariffs to compensate for loss 
aversion.  Furthermore, industries with smaller domestic output and high elasticity of 
import demand (in absolute value) receive lower level of protection and smaller 
deviations from free trade.  
  Our modified model also provides an explanation for some of the puzzling results 
in the recent empirical literature on political economy of protection
12. Maggi & Goldberg 
(1999) and Gawande & Bandyopadhyay (2000) aim to predict the relative weights of the 
forces influencing trade policy based on the GH model. In essence, they estimate 
                                                 
12 We would like to thank Kishore Gawande for calling our attention to this point.   21
variations of equation (16), without the loss aversion factor (i.e.  0 = L I ). For example, in 












ε δ γ τ + + =  where  i I is the indicator variable for being politically organized 
and γ  and δ  are the coefficients of z/e for unorganized and organized sectors, 
respectively. For example, in case of Goldberg & Maggi (1999), the weight on the social 
welfare in government’s objective function is given from the relationship  δ γ / ) 1 ( + = a  
and they infer a value between 50 and 70 for a based on their estimation results. This is 
rather high indicating that the government attaches 50 times more weight to social 
welfare compared welfare of organized groups
13.  However, above estimation is not the 
correct specification when loss aversion is taken into account. Second, even under the 
above specification, the relationship between a  and the estimated coefficients become 




World Prices and Domestic Protection  
We next explore how equilibrium trade policy and domestic prices respond to 
changes in the world prices, as we did in the previous section.  The distinction is the 
presence of lobbying behavior and how it responds to changes in the external economic 
environment.  We follow a slightly different path and first show how the protection level 
and domestic price level are related.   
First, consider an industry where the world  price is above the reference level.  In 
the government welfare-maximizing model, the industry receives no protection.  In the 
lobbying model, under some mild assumptions, it is straightforward to show that the 
equilibrium tariff rate of an organized lobby is increasing in the world price—this is the 
implication of the GH model that we mentioned earlier. Since loss aversion does not 
enter the objective function of the lobby group (hence, of the government), the standard 
GH effect derives the result.  The reason can be easily seen from the optimal policy 
                                                 
13 Gawande & Bandyopadhyay (2000) obtain even a higher number for a  - around 3,000. 
14 Naturally, the empirical extension of our model needs to be tested properly and might provide further 
interesting results.   22








τ ,  then we can rewrite the equilibrium tariff 
expression as the following, given that IL=0:  





























where  d y and ε ε  are, respectively,  the elasticity of domestic supply and demand of 
sector i (note we have  0 , 0 < > d y ε ε ). An increase in the world price causes a decline in 
the domestic demand to supply ratio (di/yi) and hence an increase in the equilibrium tariff 
level, assuming that the elasticities satisfy certain mild assumptions.
15 This is the region 
to the right of Point B in Figure 6.  
Next, consider the other extreme scenario where world price is so low such that, 
even with protection, the equilibrium domestic price is below the reference price level.  
This is the interior solution we identified in the previous section. Then the equilibrium 
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In this case,  the GH effect, as identified in the previous paragraph, still pushes the 
protection level to decline when the world price declines.  The loss aversion effect works 
in the same direction due to decreasing sensitivity to losses, expressed as h”<0.  (Note a 
decline in world price causes  ) ( ) (
_
i i p p π π − to increase.)  Thus, in this region, the 
equilibrium protection moves in the same direction with the world price as well.  In the 
welfare-maximizing model, (a=0 and α=1 and I=1) the result will be similar owing to 
decreasing sensitivity to losses. In Figure 6, this is presented as the region to the left of 
point A.  
                                                 
15 For example, it is sufficient for domestic demand and supply functions to have constant elasticity.   23
The key issue is what happens when the domestic price is at the reference level. 
This is akin to the corner solution from the previous section. Equations  (18) and (19), 
respectively, provide the equilibrium trade policies when the domestic price is above and 
below the reference level.  We see that expression (19) has a higher value at 
_
p since 
h’>0.  This means, when the domestic price is slightly below the reference point, the 
protection level is higher compared to the price slightly above reference point.  Therefore 
the tariff level at point A is higher than the tariff level at B in Figure 6.
16  
The next step is to determine the relationship between the equilibrium trade policy 
and world prices.  The same logic prevails as in the welfare-maximizing case from the 
previous section.  In Figure 6, let tariff levels at points A and B be denoted as τA and τB 
respectively. Although the domestic price is identical at A and B, world prices are 
different since the world price is given by p
*=p(1- τ).  More specifically, at the 




B.  The relationship between world prices 
and trade policy for prices lower than  p
*
A and higher than p
*
B is given from the 
discussion above and is presented in Figure 7.   The question is what happens to 




B .  We know that the domestic price has to 
be constant at the reference level 
_
p  in this range.  In other words, 
_
* ) 1 /( p p = −τ  for  
* * *
B A p p p < < , which means that the protection level will be declining in world prices.  
Thus, the relationship between world prices and protection exhibits the pattern in Figure 




B depends on the extent of loss aversion, the 
steeper is the loss aversion function, the further apart they will be.   
Figure 7 provides very interesting insights about the pattern of trade policy 
compared to standard political economy models where there is generally a positive 
correlation between the world price and the protection level.  Firms still receive 
increasing protection when the world price is high.  This can be interpreted as pertaining 
to sectors where domestic firms are competitive in world markets and are exporters.  We 
                                                 
16 The shape of the function to the right of the reference price depends on the shape of di/yi.  In general, it 
will be convex since a marginal increase in the tariff level is worth more when the industry is larger.  The 
same intuition will hold to the left of the reference price, moreover, diminishing sensitivity to losses 
implies that a marginal increase in price close to the reference level is worth more than a marginal increase 
away from the reference price.    24
should note this is different than the results of the previous section where there is no 
protection for prices above the reference point due to absence of lobbying. However, 
large exporters lobby the government extensively for many export-friendly policies, that 
are not direct subsidies but nevertheless tied to export performance.  For example, 
consider the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations tax provisions (and the replacement tax 
plan), which effectively provide some 6,000 companies—including some of the largest 
exporters such as Microsoft, Boeing, and Cisco Systems—with a tax break on up to 30 
percent of export earnings and are worth $4 billion to U.S. exporters.    
As the world price declines, so does protection, until we reach p
*
B.  This is a 
critical point since the corresponding domestic price is at the reference level 
_
p .  If the 
foreign price continues to decline, the government implements trade policies that exactly 




B reflects the price range for 
which the government perfectly shields domestic firms from negative world price shocks. 
This region of compensating protection is that same as in the previous section.   The 
behavioral effect outweighs the standard effect (even combined with the additional effect 
of lobbying) when the price level is not too far below the reference level, pushing the 
domestic price level back to its reference level.  The domestic price never rises above the 
reference price because agents no longer experience loss aversion when price is above 
_
p .   
If the world price were to fall below p
*
A, the marginal cost of protection becomes 
too high in terms of lost consumer surplus (recall consumer surplus is declining and 
concave in prices) whereas the marginal benefit is too low (since the producer surplus is 
increasing and convex in prices).  In addition, the loss aversion exhibits declining 
sensitivity which operates in the same direction as the above effect.  Thus, protection 
starts to decline as the world price continues to fall below p
*
A. At some point, it is 
possible that the domestic industry disappears and so does protection.  
In short, when behavioral assumptions are introduced, trade policy no longer 
exhibits a monotonic relationship with the world price as is predicted by the GH model.  
In particular, the region of compensating protection found in the government-maximizing 
model will be maintained even though the cutoff points (such as p
*
A) naturally depend on 
lobbying model’s parameters.  This structure explains some of the puzzles that had gone   25
unexplained.  In the next section, we discuss contingent protection and the extent to 
which it is used to maintain prices above a given level. 
 
VI. Trade Protection in Practice 
An important prediction of loss aversion and reference dependence in both 
models is the region of compensating protection, where tariffs are geared toward 
maintaining a domestic price at a specific level.  When closely observed, the vast 
majority of the most restrictive trade policy instruments are designed explicitly to limit 
the extent to which world price declines are transmitted to the domestic economy.  Quota 
restrictions, voluntary export restraints, safeguards, and price floors, only bind when the 
world price is low and falling.
17  Other tools of temporary protection, such as 
antidumping duties and the escape clause, are only used in a weak price environment.  In 
addition, in developing countries, bound tariffs are set well above actual levels so that 
governments have the flexibility to raise them when conditions worsen. 
Empirical evidence also shows that industries experiencing losses are much more 
likely to receive protection than otherwise similar growth industries. Marvel and Ray 
(1983) and Ray (1991) find that protection  is geared toward declining industries, and 
Trefler (1993) finds that protection is higher in ones in which import penetration has 
increased.  In addition, countries have resisted liberalization in industries with declining 
employment and rising import penetration (Baldwin 1985).
18   
The most restrictive instruments of protection tend to be geared toward 
maintaining incomes and prices in declining sectors.  We follow with some examples 
from the United States. Quotas are perhaps the most restrictive policies in the United 
States, protecting the highly “sensitive” sectors of agriculture and textiles and apparel, 
and can be easily manipulated to preserve prices.  For example, a carefully-managed 
system of bilateral quotas has kept the U.S. sugar price above $0.20 a pound since 1985, 
despite low and highly volatile world prices (see Figure 8).  The program uses a 
combination of tariff-rate quotas and loan guarantees to maintain the price.  Because 
                                                 
17 VRAs and quotas are still an anomaly since in general they transfer rents to the foreign producer as 
opposed to a tariff which keeps rents through the revenue generated. 
18 Baldwin (1989) remarks that loss aversion is a possible explanation.    26
expanding supplies and falling world prices, quotas have been declining during much of 
this period.  A similar program is employed in Europe. 
Despite their name, antidumping duties, now the leading source of contingent 
protection, are sought and imposed to prevent sector-specific losses and not to counteract 
dumping.
19  For example, the steel industry, by far the largest user of U.S. antidumping 
law,
20 has historically benefited from many types of protection. The policies were clearly 
geared toward maintaining prices—as evidenced by the 1977 trigger-price mechanism, 
which established a minimum import price, and a series of voluntary restraint 
agreements.  As those types of protection were gradually eliminated by the GATT, the 
sector has turned to antidumping to prevent losses when prices declined. A particularly 
interesting feature of the steel industry, which further demonstrates that antidumping is 
about losses, is that during world price slumps only a declining subsector, the integrated 
producers, called for protection.  From 1969 to 1999, price declines led to increased calls 
for protection from the old-fashioned integrated producers, where production was 
declining and profits were falling.  In contrast, minimills, which used new electric-arc 
technology and experienced output and profit growth, refused to sign on to antidumping 
petitions.  Figure 9 shows the U.S. and world prices of steel.  Again, the clear picture is 
of one where domestic firms are sheltered from price declines.  Before March of 1999, 
average domestic prices were kept above $350 per metric ton while the world price 
fluctuated between $230/ton and $450/ton.  Only in recent years, as the integrated sector 
shrunk and many plants were shut down, protection level began to decline and domestic 
prices finally broke the $350/ton barrier. 
Limiting losses is reflected in U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program as well.  
For example, the extent of assistance provided to farmers is based on the difference 
between the current price and the average price of a given product over the last five 
years, i.e. the industry losses. This is rather different from the estimated cost of adjusting 
to a more competitive environment, which is the original motivation behind the program.  
  In sum, the main forms of protection in use today are initiated by price declines 
and appear to be guided by a desire to maintain domestic prices above some reference 
                                                 
19 See Tharakan (1996) for a survey of the evidence. 
20 About half of the more than 200 antidumping orders currently in force are on imported steel.      27
level.  Only when industries decline sufficiently, does protection begin to be phased out. 
The elimination of the apparel quotas established decades ago under the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) is a typical example of this phenomenon.   
 
VII.   Conclusion 
We augment a standard government welfare-maximizing model and the 
Grossman-Helpman model of lobbying for protection with assumptions borrowed from 
behavioral economics.  The G-H model is attractive because it provides micro-
foundations for the abundance of lobbying and protection observed in the United States 
and other countries.  But by employing a standard utility function, the model cannot 
explain why protection should be so concentrated among declining industries.  This is an 
area where loss aversion plays an important role, as industries are noticeably more vocal 
when profits fall than when they rise.  We find that incorporating loss aversion and 
reference dependence into the agent’s utility function helps explain many of the 
interesting features of the structure and the dynamics of protectionist policies.   
Of particular interest, the models produce an intermediate range of world prices 
for which a price decline leads to an offsetting increase in protection.  We show that this 
region of compensating protection is increasing in the extent of loss aversion experienced 
by agents.  This result provides intuition for why so many of the instruments of protection 
that have been employed around the world, such as price floors and import quantity 
restrictions, focus on maintaining domestic prices at a given level.   
While the model does not directly address the anti-trade bias, it provides several 
reasons why an anti-trade bias may result.  One, negative shocks may be more likely to 
occur in import-competing industries where comparative advantage does not lie than in 
the export sector where technology tends to be improving.   Two, if tariffs have been in 
place historically for revenue reasons, then the attempt to dismantle them should be met 
with resistance primarily from the import-competing sectors that have the most to lose.  
Three, it may have to do with the perceived fairness of tariffs versus subsidies—an area 
we have touched on with our survey but that warrants future research. 
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Figure 9: Steel Prices 
($U.S. per metric ton) 
Average 12 month moving average price for beams, plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled and rebar.  
Source WSD Pricetrack. 
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